Claudio Gutierrez 
Translated from Spanish by Inés Gutiérrez
Claudio Gutierrez
This fallacy of relevance consists of deducing from the event that a proposition has not been proven false that such proposition is false, i.e. its opposing proposition is true. For example, we can say that since no one has demonstrated that there are no inhabitants on Mars, there probably are. Or, what can you answer to the superstitious person pressed to give reasons to believe that the Boogie Man exists, who says: “Prove that he does not”?
Nevertheless, there are certain cases in which reasoning in the absence of proof can be legitimate. The first one may occur in a court of law; due to a rule incorporated into all civilized judicial systems, namely that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Likewise, on many occasions the law establishes a presumption in favor of certain events, and loads “the burden of proof” on whosoever denies it. A second general case occurs in connection with the commonsense tendency to reject certain events of an extraordinary or “miraculous” nature. People are so prone to believe in fables that we would do well to question any witness pretending to have seen wonders until indisputable evidence is provided. Equally questionable are experiences of spiritualism, apparition tales, testimonies about flying saucers, telepathy, memories of other lives, etc.
Very often we tend to believe that if two events happen one after the other, or both at the same time and at the same place, the first one –or either if they are simultaneous– is the cause for the other. Experience confirms this tendency, because it tells us that a temporary succession or simultaneity of events is symptomatic of a causality relationship. For example, when the Sun rises the Earth is lighted, when it sets darkness returns; when a flame is too close to a piece of paper, it ignites, etc. But the truth is that a temporary succession or the simultaneity of events not always indicates with absolute certainty that one event is the cause of another. We are often wrong in this appreciation, especially in fields in which many conditions act simultaneously, such as medicine, economy, or agriculture. It is a fact that a common cold has yet no cure, other than the simple lapse of time. Therefore, an advice given by my doctor to a person who wanted to spend money on cold medicines was clever: “Pick up eight pebbles and put them on a jar especially labeled "cold medicine"; each morning before breakfast, take one and throw it out of the window. When the jar is empty, you will see how well you will feel.” We are pretty sure that the succession of these particular events (finishing the jar and the cold being cured) does not imply in any way that the first one is the cause of the other. But the situation may be different if instead of pebbles someone (a pharmaceutical company, perhaps) had put in the jar some "real" cold medicine and recommended you to swallow them. The two situations, however, are quite germane.
Recently, a grain purchasing company gave away to farmers blue-tinted peas to be use by them as seed; years before they had been given red-tinted peas, but the seed was exactly the same. That year the weather conditions were bad, and they collected a poor harvest. It is quite understandable, but unfounded, that now no farmer accepts blue-tinted seed.
Another example: in a recent discussion about the establishment of new indirect taxes, there were many arguments affirming that this kind of taxes would make life dearer and worsen the lot of the poor. The conclusion reached was also different from the one which they had set out to establish, i.e. that the new taxes should not be approved. For the argument to be relevant, it would have to proven in addition that there are other –more humane– solutions to overcome the current fiscal crisis.
The change of conclusion can become legitimate if in the course of the discussion, it is discovered that the subject in question is not worth it, and that a new one is more urgent or important. But then, the parties must realize this and agree explicitly to pursue the new conclusion, so that the reasoning does not turn out to be sheer sophistry.
This fallacy consists of arbitrarily preventing the reaching of all the conclusions naturally following from given premises. In most cases of moral or policy discussions the parties’ interest is to demonstrate that a certain measure is good (or bad) because it produces good (or bad) effects. This is usually done by pointing the effects that most interest us, normally omitting those that do not. We can defend protectionism by adducing that, on account of the disappearance of protection, many firms would be eliminated from the market and the families of employees let down, left without subsistence. But we will not say that, by eliminating the protection, the companies to suffer will be those which are inefficient and unsuitable for the conditions of the country, and that the measure will recondition the economy and make it more productive, for the benefit of all participants. We can defend salary increases in State institutions, exaggerating their importance and productivity. Also, we may allege that the workers have needs to be attended to, but refrain from mentioning the inevitable inflationary effect of these increases, which will lower the acquisitive power of the company workers (and of all consumers, for that matter!).
Sometimes our arguments fail not because they establish a different conclusion, but because they establish as a conclusion what has already been accepted as premise. In this case, we have a vicious circle. If we affirm that promises must be kept because being loyal to agreements is a virtue, the apparent argument is also a waste of time; if we have already accepted that loyalty to what we have agreed to is a virtue, we do not need to prove that promises must be kept, for both sentences mean the same thing. But the vicious circle technique is more important when used in the opposite sense: having the conclusion intended to be proven, we ask the other party to accept as premise for it a statement that in reality proposes the same thing in a concealed way. In substance, this procedure is a way of making my opponent to accept what I want, without any proof whatsoever; ... leaving him with the belief that he has witnessed one! If we want to prove that import duties must exist to hinder the entrance to the country of foreign products, cheaper than those produced nationally, the statement “we must protect national industry” does not serve as premise. This proposition asserts exactly the same thing which we are supposed to demonstrate. In fact, protecting national industry –in the normal meaning of this expression– consist of hindering the entrance to the country of goods which are cheaper than those produced here.
There are cases where circular reasoning is not a logical failure: when we use as premise a definition which leads you to immediately conclude what you intend to prove – in such cases, we say that the conclusion is true “by definition”. In a certain way, what is said in the conclusion was already present in the premise. However, this inference can be useful and is legitimate. We postpone its study to the occasion when we tackle the subject of definition.
In a discussion on any important subject, it can happen that one of the parties tries to strengthen its position by appealing to the opinion of another person or entity of high repute. In these cases, we make use of an appeal to authority. Such argumentation can be perfectly legitimate, for example, when a great scientist is quoted in order to resolve a problem within his field, or a famous theologian to resolve a religious dispute within his o her confession. But, on the other extreme, it can be clearly fallacious when the expert or revered authority is quoted on matters outside the province of his realm of expertise. It is not useful to quote the Bible in order to decide if biological species are the product of evolution, nor to quote Darwin to refute the theological concept that man is created in the image and likeness of God. On the other hand, sometimes the type of authority is confused: one thing is intellectual authority –and that is the one relevant in the discussion– and another, very different, is government or church authority. If the President of the Republic is also a university professor, quoting him in a scientific discussion can be appropriate; but if he is quoted as a scientific expert, his authority is not that of the President. If the Bishop is also a theologian, his opinions on theological questions can be important in a religious discussion; but his opinion will be valued as that of a theologian, not as that of a Bishop. Besides, in quoting a university professor his or her specialty is all important: e.g. the fame of an eminent physics professor will no carry over problems of economics.
Finally, we must guard us against the cheapest style of fallacy of authority. If a person is very popular, because of his success as football player or pop singer, credibility in his/her opinions do not have to increase. If a famous artist or a great sportsperson recommends a type of clothing or a car model, his opinion will carry the same authority as that of anyone else. Unless, of course, he or she is also an expert in the matter.
28. Universal or Majority Accord
If everyone agrees on something, the subject of the agreement can be true, but it can also be false. The pretended “universal assent” in religion has perhaps some value; but the fact that a great majority of mankind believe or have believed in a supreme being does not prove that such an entity exists; it just proves –by inductive method– that there is a tendency in mankind to believe in supernatural beings, certainly in need of some explanation. On the other hand, the agreement by a majority or unanimity of votes in a parliament decree asserting the existence (or non-existence) of God, lacks absolutely any demonstrative value.
The fallacy of universal accord, “it is true because everyone says so”, is one of the most deplorable weaknesses of humankind, and originates or contributes to maintain the ruling of all kinds of prejudices. No intelligent person should be favorably disposed to accept something as true just because all or the majority of his friends or colleagues consider it to be true. Nevertheless, universal consensus –especially that of well-educated and responsible people– must move us to seriously consider the possibility of what being asserted being also true, and to carefully examine the arguments on which these honorable people base their opinions.
No one in their right mind would consider telling the person with whom he is having an argument: “Either you agree with me or I’ll blow your head off!” It would be evident that such person is completely irrational and is acting like a barbarian. But there are much more subtle ways to make a threat; we are not saying that people who use threats are all barbarians, but we do say that they are straying from the rational or logical approach to overcoming disagreements.
During a recent parliamentary debate, a well-known wealthy man paid in a daily paper an open letter to members of Congress of a particular party with this aggressive injunction: “Take notice you fellows that your decision in this matter could be held against you at the coming election.” The threat of withholding votes was not so veiled; but the subtler content intended was rather to remind the elected officers that the subscriber would abstain in the future from supporting their political party. Another example of this fallacy occurs when the Directorate of a political party gives “guidelines” to their member on issues pending in Congress. Closely regarded, such recommendations of action constitute a veiled threat that if the Congress member oversteps these guidelines he or she may suffer political ostracism.
However, threats such as these should not always be considered illegitimate. If, in the course of a parliamentary debate a group of followers tells their representatives that their previous support, based on the fidelity to a certain program, might not continue, such warning is perfectly legitimate and should not be reputed as fallacious. Actually, members of Congress are chosen by the voters, and they have all the right to demand compliance with their commission. Even a reminder by the party's Directorate to the congresspersons about their commitment to the voters may very well be in perfect order.
In general, the borderline between the legitimate and sophistic use of threats is thin, the distinction calling for keen extra-logical considerations of cultural, psychological and ethical nature.
EThis type of argument is the favorite instrument of demagogues. It consists of appealing to the least rational part of the personality of those one wishes to convince. It can be based upon considerations of pity or mercy; e.g. in favor of a criminal who has committed a crime but “has many children and must continue working to support them.” But it is used most frequently in its populace variety of saying things that people like to hear, with the purpose of predisposing them to accept what we want to obtain from them. In political speeches this style is practically universal. That is why we should be heavily on our guard when we attend political meetings or any other kind of mass meeting.
We can also say here that there can be legitimate uses for this type of argument. The most evident takes place if the purpose of the speech is to motivate people to support a crusade. TV fund-raisings are a relevant example. On the other hand, there is no problem with saying things that people want to hear inasmuch as what is said be serious and reasonable. It can also be important to defend a criminal guilty of a first offense by mentioning the corrupting conditions of imprisonment, alleging that it will be worse for society to condemn him than to acquit him on this first offense. Here it is also difficult to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the argument, as in so many other cases.
In a discussion, the guns of one of the debaters are often directed not against his adversary’s arguments but rather against his or her character. Such arguments use to be called arguments against the man (ad hominem, in Latin), and consist of withdrawing authority from the person of our opponent by affirming that, due to specific reasons, she or he is not worthy of our trust. It can be said that the opponent is an artful liar, or has been condemned for dishonesty, or has extremist ideas, or belongs to a particular political or religious group that currently does not enjoy popular favor. Such proceedings are not rational and are totally against the rules governing a civilized and logical discussion. This is so because to be a rational debater one is bound to judge the given arguments solely in the light of their merits, independently of the proposing person’s affiliations or conduct.
This does not mean that we should not intelligently consider the sources of the opposing arguments. In certain cases, the fact that my opponent is not worthy of trust can be decisive, and it can be our duty to point this out. In a parliamentary discussion, the disclosure that a deputy defending a certain law which favors a specific firm has just acquired that firm stocks, can be absolutely relevant to the discussion. In deed, logic and ethics cannot be totally separated in the explanation of human affairs. On the other hand, to better understand the nature of the arguments used by our opponent, it can be important and often even necessary to dwell upon the ideology of the person with whom we are discussing. A Marxist will give a special meaning to certain terms, such as “contradictions”, “structures”, “revolution”, etc., and it would be clever to keep that in mind so as to not misunderstand him. The same is true of liberals, Christians, democrats, etc. Furthermore, it would be good to take into account our opponent’s ideology in order to anticipate where his arguments are leading. But all these can be considered by avoiding the extremely inelegant, illogical, and ungentlemanly indiscriminate personal attacks implicit in the application of labels to people.
Sometimes we make use of a personal argument, not necessarily offensive, to compel our opponent to reconsider the position involved. For example, we can very well criticize someone opposed to necessary social changes by reminding him that he is a Christian, and that one of the main teachings of his Church is to love your fellow beings. And this can be fine, that is, completely legitimate. But it can also happen that the doctrines sustained by the person with whom we are discussing are so abhorrent to the polemist that appealing to them for the sake of winning a discussion would not only be irrelevant but also totally indecent. For example, it would be improper for a person opposed to the US intervention in Vietnam (or Iraq, for that matter!) –because he considers that war unjust– to ask the United States’ intervention in favor of Israel, whose cause is deemed just by the petitioner, proposing as an argument that the US intervened in Vietnam. In any event, admonishing our opponent over the need for consistency is a rhetorical recourse having nothing directly to do with the discussion at hand. We must endeavor ourselves to prove our point, in contradiction to that of our opponent, independently of the fact that the opinions of the opponent be or not be consistent with others in relation to a different context.