Contradiction
Formal defect or symptom of ontological density?

There are two ways of considering contradiction in ordinary language and philosophical writings: the logical or analytical concept, which considers it a defect of reasoning; and the dialectical or synthetic conception which considers it as a symptom of ontological density. The opposition between both concepts is itself an example of contradiction (of a dialectical kind). This situation is examined in order to decide if the two uses of the term "contradictory" are equivocal, univocal, or analogous. The author favor the latter, since the dialectical use seems to contain all the meaning of the analytical use, plus an amount of additional meaning.

The object of knowledge is the concrete or real. But in order to reach the concrete it is necessary to pass through the abstract. The synthesis, which constitutes our orientation in the world, starts out as an analysis consisting in separating things known into their elements or factors. Analysis and synthesis are related in the same way as form to content, text to context. An analysis which separates text from context takes away part of its content; in the end, a form will remain, a text with a minimum of context. But the synthesis would reintegrate the text into the context; thus, the concrete will become illuminated by its passage through the abstract.

Content and formalism correspond to two fundamental linguistic dimensions: semantics and syntax. The syntactical is the minimum, immediate and manageable context. The semantical is the expansive context, which takes the intellect into ever wider circles of meaning. The syntactical is a matter of calculation; the semantical, of reflection. All thought is at once both syntactical and semantical. A thought consisting of pure reflection would be incommunicable and impractical; it would continue to float indefinitely on endless indifference without ever deciding what to say or do. On the other hand, absolute formalism is impossible, because to formalize is to replace one content with another, considered simpler for the purpose at hand. All formalization consists in the construction of a model, and this model has also content. Pure structure, without a material substratum to incarnate in, simply does not exist.

To know is to assimilate essences. The empiricist ideal does not require that we dispense with the use of the term "essence." It is sufficient that we cast off the notion of eternal essences and understand that essences are dependent upon context. What is not essential in one context becomes so within another, and vice versa. The term "essence" is indispensable; if objects admit of classification, if uniformity exists in nature, we must have essences in order to be able to express those regularities. The universe consists of interrelationships of events; every object points to other objects, to such degree that we cannot conceive of the universe except as an immense network of interrelationships. In this network, especially dense nodes constitute essences. Understanding supposes that we are able to separate the essential from the accidental, strong connections from the weak ones. But there is not in nature essential distinction between strong and week connections. Essence is not only contextual; it also admits degrees.

Everything real is interconnection; knowledge is real and therefore interconnection. Knowledge has as its object the real, therefore it is a triple interconnection. In order to know we interact with an interaction. It is never given in experience the pair, subject-object, but the triple, subject-object-context. All interactions are material, i.e., work. The work of knowledge is called analysis, which is the attempt to force context out of its triple connection in order to –methodically– forge a simpler relationship between mind and object. The eliminated context reacts by infiltrating itself into the new formal structure as some kind of insufficiency which very often constitutes a contradiction. The contradiction may, serve as a key to redefinition, as a testimony of the need to restore or amplify a context. In this sense, and only in this sense, contradiction is a symptom of the complexity of the real, it shows the essence. Finding contradictions can signify the discovery of essences, since the contradiction makes necessary an amplification of the context which enriches the content of the former definitions. There may be contradictions that are more or less severe, just as there are richer and less rich essences. It is possible to have degrees of contradiction, just as there may be degrees of essence. The principal contradiction, which demands the most severe context reformulations, is the essence of the situation in the most proper sense. Thought progresses from definition to definition through contradiction: this is what constitutes dialectics. Contradiction ceases to be the absurd if it is understood as a call upon language to reformulate the universe of discourse.

Calculus consists in dealing with definitions. Reflection, by contrast, implies venturing beyond the definitions obtained, in search of more extensive contents. Reflection is prompted toward these new contents by the transformation of the presently accepted definitions into irritating contradictions. The contradiction crops out in the definition as an imperious need for redefinition. It can remain there for a considerable time, since the process of contextual redefinition is not an easy one. Because of the inherent difficulty of contextual redefinition, pretending to solve a contradiction quickly is frivolous and antiscientific. The worthy scientist, just as the worthy man, knows how to wait and live among contradictions. He is convinced that it is often a good thing for contradictions to subsist and even become sharper in order that his powers of penetration may reveals with greater clarity the essence of the situation.